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In 2010, the United States Congress enacted the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to 
prevent a recurrence of the 2008 financial collapse. Since its 
passage, the Act’s many reforms have reshaped the financial 
markets, but faulty executive implementation has undermined 
some of these components. One such issue arose in the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission’s interpretation of 
Dodd-Frank’s Title VII central clearing mandate, which 
Congress included to stabilize and bring transparency to the 
over-the-counter derivatives market. The SEC has not yet 
effected mandatory clearing of security-based swaps—the 
financial products which Dodd-Frank subjected to the agency’s 
jurisdiction—but the SEC’s publicly contemplated approach 
omits “commission-initiated review,” a core component of Title 
VII’s structure. Without this type of review, many security-
based swaps will remain outside the scope of mandatory 
central clearing, causing the SEC to fall short of its statutory 
mandate and Congress’ intent. This Note urges the SEC and 
lawmakers to take the necessary steps to address the 
“commission-initiated review” missing link and ensure the 
regulatory regime successfully includes the entire scope of 
financial products subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A number of complex and diverse factors created and 
deepened the 2008 financial crisis. Academics’ and regulators’ 
attempts to identify the most important contributing factors 
generated significant discussion and disagreement.1 
However, a general consensus emerged on one point—
derivative products played a central role in exacerbating the 
crisis.2 At some of the most turbulent moments, the highly 
interconnected derivatives market served to stoke 
institutional fear and dramatically increase financial entities’ 
exposure to risky assets.3 Although identifying specific 
 
1 See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xvi (2011) 
[hereinafter FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [perma.cc/E7EZ-LE6A] (“While the 
vulnerabilities that created the potential for crisis were years in the 
making, it was the collapse of the housing bubble—fueled by low interest 
rates, easy and available credit, scant regulation, and toxic mortgages—that 
was the spark that ignited a string of events[.]”); see also James Crotty, 
Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of 
the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 564 (2009) 
(“[The financial crisis’] deep cause on the financial side is to be found in the 
flawed institutions and practices of the current financial regime[.]”). 
2 See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default 
Swaps: A Case Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 
639 (2010) (“On both sides of the Atlantic, regulators identified credit 
default swaps (CDS) as a central factor in the crisis that seized Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, American International Group (AIG), and 
ultimately the world.”); id. at 639 n.1 (citations omitted) (“CDS became a 
central culprit in the popular press as well.”); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 
supra note 1, at xxiv–xxv (“We conclude over-the-counter derivatives 
contributed significantly to this crisis. . . . [W]hen the housing bubble 
popped and crisis followed, derivatives were in the center of the storm.”). 
3 Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian 
Argument for Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives, 28 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 225–26 (2014) (“[Derivatives] were 
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solutions proved to be a difficult undertaking after the crisis, 
those studying derivatives’ role in the crisis voiced a variety 
of concerns, which, if addressed, could help prevent future 
crises and reduce systematic instability.4 
In response to the so-called Great Recession, Congress 
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).5 One of Dodd-Frank’s 
central reforms, codified in Title VII, requires parties trading 
certain over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives to clear and 
execute the transactions through central clearinghouses.6 
However, the Act did not define which OTC derivatives would 
be subject to the central clearing mandate. Instead, Congress 
delegated this definitional task to two federal agencies: the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC,” 
responsible for “swaps”), and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC,” responsible for “security-based 
swaps”).7 Under Title VII’s structure, both agencies are 
required to make their central clearing determinations on the 
basis of two different inputs: (1) submissions received from 
clearinghouses seeking to voluntarily clear swaps or security-
 
indirectly involved in the financial crisis in a number of ways, though, the 
most important of which was simultaneously the least well understood: 
their role in creating a highly interconnected financial system that fostered 
a climate of extreme fear[.]”). 
4 See, e.g., Chander & Costa, supra note 2, at 642 (“[R]egulators on both 
sides of the Atlantic turned to CDS clearing as one key reform in the wake 
of the financial crisis.”). 
5 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
6 See generally Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111–203 §§ 701, 711–54, 761–74, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–
1802 (2010).  
7 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(A) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person 
to engage in a swap unless that person submits such swap for clearing to a 
derivatives clearing organization . . . if the swap is required to be cleared.”); 
15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage 
in a security-based swap unless that person submits such security-based 
swap for clearing to a clearing agency . . . if the security-based swap is 
required to be cleared.”). 
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based swaps;8 and (2) the agency’s own review of products that 
are currently traded by market participants, but are not 
clearable through a central clearinghouse (and therefore not 
submitted for review).9 
The CFTC rapidly implemented its Title VII mandate. In 
2011, the agency finalized a rule establishing processes for 
swap submissions and for top-down review of unclearable 
products (the “CFTC Process Rule”).10 Beginning with a rule 
promulgated in 2012 (the “Initial CFTC Clearing Mandate”), 
the agency used these processes to designate certain swaps for 
mandatory clearing.11 Additionally, the CFTC issued a 
subsequent rule in 2016 (the “Additional CFTC Clearing 
Mandate”) to expand coverage to additional swap products.12 
 
8 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (“A derivatives clearing 
organization shall submit to the [CFTC] each swap . . . that it plans to 
accept for clearing[.]”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“A clearing agency 
shall submit to the [SEC] each security-based swap . . . that it plans to 
accept for clearing[.]”). 
9 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (“The [CFTC] on an ongoing basis 
shall review each swap . . . to make a determination as to whether the swap 
. . . should be required to be cleared.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(1)(A) (2012) 
(“The [SEC] on an ongoing basis shall review each security-based swap . . . 
to make a determination that such security-based swap . . . should be 
required to be cleared.”). 
10 See generally Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 
76 Fed. Reg. 44,464 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140). 
Top-down review refers to the agency’s ongoing role reviewing new swap 
transactions in the market to determine whether they are of a type that 
should be subject to the clearing requirement. See infra Section II.C.2. 
11 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,315–16 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 39, 50) (“[P]roposed § 50.4 set forth the classes of interest rate 
swaps and CDS that the [CFTC] proposed for required clearing. . . . [T]he 
[CFTC] is adopting § 50.4(a) and (b).”). 
12 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,202, 
71,226 (Oct. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50) (expanding the 
central clearing obligation to additional classes of interest rate swaps). 
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Through these rules, the CFTC subjected a significant portion 
of the swaps market to a central clearing requirement.13 
By contrast, the SEC—operating under identical 
authorizing statutory language as the CFTC—has not yet 
made any determinations regarding which security-based 
swaps will be covered by Title VII’s central clearing 
requirement.14 While the SEC established processes for 
security-based swap submissions in a 2012 rule (the “SEC 
Process Rule”),15 the agency is awaiting finalization of several 
other related rules before accepting security-based swap 
submissions or making any determinations.16 Although the 
timelines for finalization and effective dates of such 
 
13 See infra Section III.B.1 (noting that, per the statistics provided in 
the CFTC’s releases, the Initial CFTC Clearing Mandate and Additional 
CFTC Clearing Mandate together cover a majority of the swap market). 
14 See infra Section II.D.2 (discussing the SEC’s regulatory actions 
taken so far). For a comparison of the SEC and CFTC’s regulatory 
approaches, see infra Figure 2. 
15 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,605 (July 13, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (“[T]he [SEC] is adopting amendments 
. . . to establish processes for . . . how clearing agencies registered with the 
[SEC] must submit Security-Based Swap Submissions to the [SEC] for a 
determination by the [SEC] of whether the security-based swap . . . 
referenced in the submission is required to be cleared[.]”). 
16 See Statement of General Policy on the Sequencing of the 
Compliance Dates for Final Rules Applicable to Security-Based Swaps 
Adopted Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
35,625, 35,635 (June 14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“[G]iven 
the dependency of the [security-based] swap mandatory clearing regime 
upon other Title VII final rules yet to be adopted, the [SEC] believes 
[security-based] swaps should not be required to be cleared until after the 
later of: (1) The compliance date of certain of the final rules resulting from 
the Clearing Agency Standards Proposing Release; (2) the compliance date 
of final rules resulting from the End-User Clearing Exception Proposing 
Release; and (3) the Commission determining whether to propose 
amendments to the existing net capital and customer protection 
requirements applicable to broker-dealers . . . and whether to address 
portfolio margining with swaps.”). 
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rulemakings remain unclear, the SEC’s guidance indicates 
that submissions will begin once these preliminary rules take 
effect.17 
However, the SEC has provided no further guidance on 
whether commission-initiated review will take place or the 
procedures the SEC will follow in conducting such review.18 
This lack of interest in top-down review for uncleared 
products will undercut the effectiveness of the central clearing 
requirement for security-based swaps. While the CFTC’s 
mandatory clearing determinations have not displayed why 
commission-initiated review is necessary (so far, the CFTC 
has relied only on submissions from central clearinghouses), 
the submission-only approach successfully implemented the 
statutory mandate because swaps were already widely cleared 
voluntarily prior to the central clearing mandate’s 
implementation.19 Currently, a far smaller proportion of the 
security-based swap market is voluntarily cleared, meaning 
submissions will fail to cover most of the security-based swap 
market already in existence.20 Further, in contrast with the 
SEC, the CFTC established the processes for top-down review 
in the CFTC Process Rule, even though these processes have 
not yet been used.21 By providing clear standards for top-down 
 
17 Id. 
18 See infra Section II.D.2 (discussing the SEC’s very limited 
preparation and discussion of commission-initiated review). 
19 See infra Section III.B.1 (showing swaps were significantly cleared 
voluntarily when the CFTC’s mandatory clearing requirement took effect). 
20 Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics, Global OTC Derivatives 
Market: Commodity Contracts, Credit Default Swaps, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/tseries/OTC_DERIV/H:N:A:Y:R: 
A:A:5A:5J?t=D5.2&p=20171&i=28.4&x=OD_CPARTY.5.CL_OD_CPARTY
&o=s:line,z:3 [perma.cc/S2JW-3JNS] (showing number of Index CDS trades 
with central clearing parties); Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics, 
Global OTC Derivatives Market: Commodity Contracts, Credit Default 
Swaps, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/tseries/ 
OTC_DERIV/H:N:D:Y:N:A:A:5A:5J?t=D5.2&p=20171&i=26.8&x=OD_CPA
RTY.5.CL_OD_CPARTY&o=s:line,z:3 [perma.cc/X8VS-QBSK] (showing 
number of single-name CDS trades with central clearing parties). 
21 See Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 44,464, 44,469 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50) 
(“Section 723(a)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act and Regulation 39.5(c) require the 
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review, the CFTC informed the market that even uncleared 
swaps could be reviewed, incentivizing industry members to 
pursue voluntary clearing for any swap products that are 
currently uncleared.22 In the security-based swap context, 
without any indication that the SEC will conduct commission-
initiated review in the future, there is little regulatory 
impetus for firms to begin voluntary clearing. Accordingly, not 
only are most products under the SEC’s jurisdiction currently 
unreviewable under the expected submission-only process, 
they will likely remain outside the scope of the SEC’s 
oversight. 
Because the SEC’s approach fails to fulfill Title VII’s 
intentions and directives, the agency is violating Dodd-
Frank’s statutory mandate. Although compelling agency 
action through litigation can be difficult, the Supreme Court 
set forth a blueprint for doing so in Massachusetts v. 
Environmental Protection Agency.23 This case’s playbook for 
challenging an agency’s failure to regulate despite a statutory 
obligation to do so may provide one solution to the SEC’s 
inaction, especially in light of the agency’s lack of explanation 
for its refusal to regulate. However, parties seeking to 
vindicate a general injury to the economy may not have 
standing to sue the SEC. Instead, the ability to litigate may 
be limited to the potentially regulated parties, who may have 
limited incentives to prompt such regulation. Finding a party 
both able and willing to bring a suit may, therefore, be 
difficult. Alternately, reformers could pursue political routes, 
such as encouraging closer congressional oversight of Dodd-
Frank’s implementation to put pressure on the SEC. 
In Part II, this Note describes Dodd-Frank’s regulatory 
structure and the disparate approaches to implementation 
taken by the CFTC and the SEC (together, the “Financial 
 
Commission, on an ongoing basis, to review swaps that have not been 
accepted for clearing by a [derivatives clearing organization] to make a 
determination as to whether the swaps should be required to be cleared.”). 
22 See infra Section III.B.3 (discussing the role of regulatory incentives 
in prompting voluntary clearing). 
23 See generally Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007).  
  
260 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
Regulators”). Part III examines the impact of the SEC’s 
approach on the efficacy of Dodd-Frank’s goal of mandatory 
central clearing. Finally, Part IV argues that the flaws in the 
SEC’s implementation of mandatory central clearing should 
be addressed through litigation or increased political 
oversight. 
II. CONGRESS’ RESPONSE TO OTC DERIVATIVES’ 
ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: DODD-FRANK’S 
CENTRAL CLEARING MANDATE 
In 2010, Dodd-Frank effected sweeping reforms of the 
financial industry to protect the United States and global 
markets from a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis.24 In 
response to the destabilizing impact of institutional failures 
leading up to and during the crisis, Dodd-Frank intended “to 
promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system[.]”25 In order to achieve these goals and address the 
variety of problems exposed by the 2008 collapse, Dodd-
Frank’s drafters enlisted the help of experts at a number of 
financial agencies by delegating a diverse set of regulatory 
mandates.26  
A. OTC Derivatives: What is a Swap? 
To fully understand Dodd Frank’s delegation strategy and 
mandate in the derivatives context, a basic understanding of 
swaps and their role in the financial crisis is necessary. 
Following the crisis, one of Congress’ driving concerns was the 
systemic risk presented by the OTC derivatives market.27 
 
24 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
25 Id. at 1376. 
26 See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111–203 § 712(a)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–42 (2010) (requiring 
the CFTC and SEC consult and coordinate with one another “before 
commencing any rulemaking or issuing an order” relating to Title VII). 
27 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,284–85 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 
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This market includes a variety of financial products, but for 
the purposes of this Note, the basic mechanics of a swap can 
best be illustrated through the example of a credit default 
swap (“CDS”).28 A CDS allows a creditor (the CDS buyer) to 
transfer the credit risk of debt she holds to another party (the 
CDS seller) in exchange for a premium.29 If the debtor on the 
original loan defaults, the CDS buyer transfers the debt 
securities to the CDS seller, who pays the notional amount of 
the debt in return.30 The premium that the CDS buyer pays 
amounts to the CDS seller’s fee for taking on the risk. In 
exchange, the CDS buyer avoids the risk of significant losses 
on the underlying debt in the event of default. In bespoke, 
bilaterally-negotiated CDSs, parties can specify additional 
credit events or payment amounts, tailoring the product to 
their individual needs and risk profiles.31 
 
C.F.R. pts. 39, 50) (“The financial crisis also illustrated the significant risks 
that an uncleared, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market can pose to 
the financial system. . . . Recognizing the peril that the U.S. financial 
system faced during the financial crisis, Congress and the President came 
together to pass the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.”); see also id. at xvi (“When 
the bubble burst, hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and 
mortgage-related securities shook markets as well as financial institutions 
that had significant exposures to those mortgages and had borrowed heavily 
against them. This happened not just in the United States but around the 
world. The losses were magnified by derivatives such as synthetic 
securities.”). For a broader discussion of the impact of derivatives on the 
financial crisis, see generally the FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1. 
28 See infra Figure 1. Although other types of swaps played significant 
roles in exacerbating the financial crisis, a bilateral CDS is used here for 
the sake of simplicity in the example. The basic concepts of the bilateral 
CDS are useful in understanding the mechanics of swaps in general and can 
be applied by analogy to other types of swaps. 
29 See Chander & Costa, supra note 2, at 642. 
30 Id. at 642–43. 
31 Id. Additional credit events are particularly useful to allow 
insurance from credit issues other than bankruptcy or a simple failure to 
pay back the loan. Typical ones include public repudiation of the debt (i.e. 
announcing an intention not to pay), acceleration of the debt, or a 
government intervention. See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2014 ISDA 
CREDIT DERIVATIVE DEFINITIONS art. IV (2014) (listing and providing 
standard language for a variety of different occurrences that can be 
included, at the parties’ election, as credit events). 
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Figure 1: Mechanics of a CDS Transaction 
 Although the type of underlying security and payment 
flows change depending on the product type, other classes of 
OTC derivatives operate in a similar manner. Broadly, swaps 
allow financial institutions and investors to trade out of a 
position or gain exposure to specific types of risk as an 
investment strategy.32 For many products, one party to the 
trade agrees to take on the unpredictability (but potential 
profitability) of an underlying security’s returns, and in 
exchange, provides their counterparty with a more 
dependable payment or premium.33 In other instances, both 
 
32 See Andreas A. Jobst, A Primer on Structured Finance, 13 J. 
DERIVATIVES & HEDGE FUNDS 199, 202–03 (2007). 
33 See id. This arrangement allows investors to gain exposure to types 
of risk to which they may not otherwise have access. For example, risk-
neutral swap dealers use their access to certain product types or markets 
(whether accessible because of the dealers’ location, relationship with 
foreign governments, or access to capital) to generate consistent revenue 
streams (the swap fee), while end-user investors pay the fee to invest in 
their desired risk-profile. John D. Finnerty & Kishlaya Pathak, A Review of 
Recent Derivatives Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 73, 84 (2011). 
The bespoke nature of swaps lets parties adapt the transaction to their 
individual risk profiles—i.e., the swap seller can retain more of the risk, in 
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sides receive variable future returns rather than a consistent 
benchmark payment, effectively trading one type of risk for 
another.34 In all of these examples, the bespoke nature of the 
transaction allows parties to adapt the terms and mechanics, 
tweaking or creating products as needed to suit the individual 
risk portfolios and appetites of each participant.35  
As a result, the OTC derivatives market is variable and 
adaptive, with as many distinct swap products as parties with 
unique needs and creative solutions. The market is also of 
notable size. The Bank for International Settlements pegged 
the notional amount of outstanding OTC derivatives contracts 
at $542 trillion at the end of June 2017.36 The gross market 
 
exchange for a higher fee—simply by adjusting the mechanics laid out in 
the contract. Investors can also use swaps as a form of financing, in which 
they receive an investment’s returns without needing to buy the underlying 
security, which will be held—again, for a fee—by the dealer. Id. 
34 See, e.g., id. at 84–85; Caitlin Hall, The Death of a Defense: How 
Derivatives Spell the End of the Good Faith Defense to Fraudulent Transfer 
Actions in Business Bankruptcies, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 152, 165 (2011) (“A 
total return swap is an agreement under which one party makes periodic 
interest payments and the other makes payments based on the return of an 
underlying asset.”). In addition to operating as a transaction where one side 
is seeking to be risk neutral, see supra note 33 and accompanying text, these 
transactions can also involve parties who are both interested in taking on 
different types of risk that are currently held by the other side (for instance, 
the risk of an underlier in exchange for the risk of an interest benchmark)—
in other words, a “swap” of risk profiles.  
35 See Finnerty & Pathak, supra note 33, at 85 (“A clever derivatives 
trader can use different derivative instruments almost interchangeably to 
achieve any particular payoff pattern.”). This adaptability is a central 
feature of swaps when they are used for hedging purposes. Parties 
interested in hedging the risk of their investments can (and often do) enter 
into derivatives to do so. For this hedging to be effective, though, the 
investor must tailor the derivative contract to mimic the terms of the 
underlying asset—any difference in terms will undermine the hedge’s 
effectiveness. For instance, if a CDS buyer fails to align the CDS’s payment 
timing with that of the underlying debt, the gap will cause the buyer to take 
on the risk of currency or market movements in the interim, limiting the 
success of their insurance. Swaps’ flexibility allows investors to retain some 
risk in this manner intentionally, but where the investor intends their 
hedges to be perfect, an off-the-shelf product would fail. 
36 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC 
DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-JUNE 2017 2 (Nov. 2, 2017), 
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value of outstanding OTC derivatives contracts was $13 
trillion as of the same time.37 OTC derivatives currently 
occupy a significant portion of financial markets, and their 
role was even greater prior to the financial crisis.38 This 
underscores the potential these products have to meaningfully 
impact the global economy. 
B. The Role of OTC Derivatives in the Financial Crisis 
According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
created to examine the 2008 financial crisis’s causes,39 OTC 
derivatives played a significant role in the 2008 collapse.40 In 
the years preceding the crisis, the OTC derivatives market 
expanded rapidly, peaking at an outstanding notional amount 
of $672.6 trillion in June 2008.41 This expansion largely 
occurred following the adoption of the Commodity Futures 
 
https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1711.pdf [https://perma.cc/92DN-6CVJ]. 
“Notional amount” refers to the theoretical value of the trade’s underlying 
security. See Definition of Notional Value, FIN. TIMES, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=notional-value [https://perma.cc/U85T-
RA38]. For instance, in a CDS trade where the CDS buyer is purchasing 
protection for the credit risk of a $1 million loan, the notional amount of the 
CDS is $1 million. 
37 Id. Gross market value refers to the value of the actual product, i.e. 
the fee it costs to purchase the derivative. See Glossary, Gross Market Value, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/statistics/glossary. 
htm?&selection=312&scope=Statistics&c=a&base=term [https://perma.cc 
/8LTR-MLHN] (“Sum of the absolute values of all outstanding derivatives 
contracts with either positive or negative replacement values evaluated at 
market prices prevailing on the reporting date.”). 
38 See infra Section II.B. 
39 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xi. 
40 Id. at xxiv (“We conclude over-the-counter derivatives contributed 
significantly to this crisis.”). By 2008, “outstanding OTC derivatives [had] 
increased more than sevenfold to a notional amount of $672.6 trillion; their 
gross market value was $20.3 trillion.” Id. In particular, former-U.S. 
treasury secretary Lawrence Summers noted that “the derivatives that 
proved to be by far the most serious, those associated with credit default 
swaps, increased 100 fold between 2000 and 2008.” Id. at 49 (internal 
citation omitted). 
41 Id. at 48 (noting also that the gross market value of outstanding OTC 
derivatives was $20.3 trillion). 
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Modernization Act of 2000,42 which deregulated the OTC 
derivatives market.43 While many institutions used OTC 
derivatives to hedge risk, these derivatives’ unregulated 
status prior to the financial crisis also made them a cost-
effective investment strategy. As a result, OTC derivatives 
often served as a mechanism to increase leverage.44 
This widespread use of OTC derivatives had two important 
consequences for the financial crisis’ depth and breadth. First, 
the lack of regulation allowed for increased leverage, leading 
to significant derivative positions.45 These large positions 
included significant stakes in CDSs, which were often used to 
insure the credit risk of mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations.46 As a result, the housing 
crisis of 2007—and the associated rise in mortgage defaults—
 
42 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
43 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 (noting 
that the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”) “in 
essence deregulated the OTC derivatives market and eliminated oversight 
by both the CFTC and the SEC.”). While the CFMA allowed the SEC to 
retain anti-fraud jurisdiction over securities-based OTC derivatives, the law 
broadly excluded various types of swap agreements and other OTC 
derivatives from regulation under the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”). 
See id; see also Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 §§ 102–107 (2000) (excluding a variety of product 
types including derivative and swap transactions from the scope of the CEA 
and expressly stating that “[n]o provision of [the CEA] shall be construed as 
implying or creating any presumption that [any transaction or agreement 
excluded or exempted from the CEA] is or would otherwise be subject to [the 
CEA].”). 
44 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 49 (“These international 
capital standards accommodated the shift to increased leverage. . . . OTC 
derivatives let derivatives traders—including the large banks and 
investment banks—increase their leverage.”). Mechanically, derivatives 
allowed for such an increase in leverage because they allowed for the swap-
holder to maintain significantly lower capital reserves, limiting the 
necessity of up-front costs paid by the investor. The amount of collateral the 
investor provides during the life of the swap is significantly lower than the 
initial outlay of purchasing the underlying security itself. Id. 
45 Id. at xix–xx. 
46 Id. at 50 (“A key OTC derivative in the financial crisis was the credit 
default swap[.]”). 
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spread to the many financial institutions trading in the CDS 
market.47 
Second, the lack of transparency in the OTC derivatives 
market obscured the size of these positions from 
counterparties and regulators.48 As entities increased their 
leverage, any decline in the value of the underlying assets 
could place the trading entities in financial turmoil.49 The 
growth of the general OTC derivatives market connected 
financial institutions to one another, increasing the possibility 
that a loss in value or instability could result in a chain 
reaction of uncertainty and banking runs.50 This heightened 
exposure thus subjected trading counterparties to increased 
credit risk, but without insight into the other side’s position, 
neither counterparties nor central regulators could gauge the 
true extent of the systemic risk.51 As the crisis deepened, this 
opacity exacerbated fears that any trading partner could be 
the next to fail, resulting in dramatic losses for all 
counterparties. This uncertainty created a vicious cycle in 
which doubt between trading partners contracted liquidity in 
OTC derivatives and further destabilized the already-
buckling markets.52 
 
47 See id. at 213 (“Much of the risk from mortgage-backed securities 
had actually been taken by a small group of systemically important 
companies with outsized holdings . . . . These companies would ultimately 
bear great losses[.]”). 
48 Id. at 386 (“Lack of transparency contributed greatly to the crisis: 
the exposures of financial institutions to risky mortgage assets and other 
potential losses were unknown to market participants, and indeed many 
firms did not know their own exposures.”). 
49 See id. at xix–xx. 
50 See id. at xx (“Massive, short-term borrowing, combined with 
obligations unseen by others in the market, heightened the chances the 
system could rapidly unravel.”). 
51 See id. at 363–64 (“This market was unregulated and largely opaque, 
with no public reporting requirements and little or no price discovery.”). 
52 Id. at 363–64, 386; see also Clearing Requirement Determination 
Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,285 (Dec. 13, 2012) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50) (“As the financial crisis deepened, 
this risk made market participants wary of trading with each other. As a 
result, markets quickly became illiquid and trading volumes plummeted.”).  
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C. Congress’ Response: The Wall Street Transparency 
and Accountability Act 
The financial crisis brought the systemic risk in the OTC 
derivatives market into the light. Afterwards, policymakers 
understood that the unregulated OTC derivatives market 
needed “a comprehensive new regulatory framework[.]”53 The 
Senate specified that, in drafting Dodd-Frank, it intended to 
promulgate “comprehensive regulation and rules for how the 
OTC derivatives market operates.”54 This objective was met 
in Title VII of Dodd-Frank, also known as The Wall Street 
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010.55 
1. Title VII’s Core: Mandatory Central Clearing 
as a Means of Risk-Prevention 
Title VII’s centerpiece is the requirement that parties clear 
their trades through central clearinghouses. Under the 
statute, this requirement does not attach to a specific product 
type until the Financial Regulators determine that it must be 
centrally cleared.56 However, while the Financial Regulators 
may determine that some OTC derivatives should remain 
uncleared (and instead be subject to heightened capital, 
margin, and reporting requirements), the Senate report 
stated a clear preference for mandatory central clearing in the 
absence of mitigating circumstances.57 The report 
acknowledged that “[s]ome parts of the OTC market may not 
 
53 Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,285. 
54 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 32 (2010). 
55 Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111–203 §§ 701, 711–54, 761–74, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–1802 (2010). 
56 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(A) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person 
to engage in a swap unless that person submits such swap for clearing to a 
derivatives clearing organization . . . if the swap is required to be cleared.”) 
(emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for 
any person to engage in a security-based swap unless that person submits 
such security-based swap for clearing to a clearing agency . . . if the security-
based swap is required to be cleared.”) (emphasis added). 
57 See S. REP. NO. 111–176, at 31–35. 
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be suitable for clearing . . . due to individual business needs,” 
but maintained that “[t]hese exceptions should be crafted very 
narrowly[.]”58 The Financial Regulators interpreted Title VII 
accordingly: the CFTC referred to the central clearing 
requirement as “one of the cornerstones of [Dodd-Frank] 
reform,”59 while the SEC noted that “[c]learing of swaps and 
security-based swaps was at the heart of Congressional 
reform of the derivatives markets[.]”60 
Although Congress asked the Financial Regulators to fill 
in the details, Title VII lays out a general structure for 
agencies to follow when making central clearing 
determinations.61 The CFTC and SEC regulate different 
product types (swaps and security-based swaps, 
respectively),62 but the statutory language is otherwise 
identical.63 For both product types, Title VII includes two 
 
58 Id. at 34. 
59 Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,285 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 39, 50).  
60 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,603 (July 13, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
61 Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111–203 §§ 701, 711–54, 761–74, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–1802 (2010). 
62 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. at 41,603 (“Title VII provides that 
the CFTC will regulate ‘swaps,’ [and] the [SEC] will regulate ‘security-based 
swaps[.]’”). The statute defines swaps as “any agreement, contract, or 
transaction” that is one of a broad variety of derivatives. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47). 
A security-based swap is a swap that is based on “a narrow-based security 
index . . . a single security or loan . . . or . . . the occurrence, 
nonoccurrence, or extent of the occurrence of an event relating to a 
single issuer of a security or the issuers of securities in a narrow-
based security index[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68). 
63 Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(A) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any 
person to engage in a swap unless that person submits such swap for 
clearing to a derivatives clearing organization that is registered under this 
chapter or a derivatives clearing organization that is exempt from 
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separate review processes: the agencies will conduct 
“[c]ommission-initiated review”64 and accept submissions65 to 
determine which products will be subject to the clearing 
requirement. Once the Financial Regulators determine, 
pursuant to this process, that a product must be cleared, it is 
unlawful to engage in a swap or security-based swap without 
central clearing.66 
Under the submission process, clearing agencies that plan 
to accept swaps or security-based swaps for clearing submit 
these swaps or security-based swaps to the Financial 
Regulators.67 Commission-initiated review directs the 
Financial Regulators to supplement these submissions with 
evaluations of those OTC derivatives that are not accepted for 
clearing anywhere—the part of the market made up of 
“privately negotiated transactions entered into by two 
 
registration under this chapter if the swap is required to be cleared.”) with 
15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage 
in a security-based swap unless that person submits such security-based 
swap for clearing to a clearing agency that is registered under this chapter 
or a clearing agency that is exempt from registration under this chapter if 
the security-based swap is required to be cleared.”). 
64 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (“The [CFTC] on an ongoing basis 
shall review each swap . . . to make a determination as to whether the swap 
. . . should be required to be cleared.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(1)(A) (2012) 
(“The [SEC] on an ongoing basis shall review each security-based swap . . . 
to make a determination that such security-based swap . . . should be 
required to be cleared.”). 
65 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (“A derivatives clearing 
organization shall submit to the [CFTC] each swap . . . that it plans to 
accept for clearing[.]”);15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“A clearing agency 
shall submit to the [SEC] each security-based swap . . . that it plans to 
accept for clearing[.]”). 
66 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(A) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person 
to engage in a swap . . . if the swap is required to be cleared.”); 15 U.S.C. § 
78c-3(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in a 
security-based swap . . . if the security-based swap is required to be 
cleared.”). 
67 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (“A derivatives clearing 
organization shall submit to the [CFTC] each swap . . . that it plans to 
accept for clearing[.]”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“A clearing agency 
shall submit to the [SEC] each security-based swap . . . that it plans to 
accept for clearing[.]”).  
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counterparties, in which each assumes the credit risk of the 
other[.]”68 When making determinations under either 
approach, the statute requires that the Financial Regulators 
consider five factors: (1) economic characteristics of the 
product, such as outstanding notional exposure, trading 
liquidity, and adequate pricing data; (2) operational viability 
of clearing the contracts consistently with their current 
material terms and trading conventions; (3) the extent to 
which mandatory clearing will mitigate systemic risk; (4) 
impact of mandatory clearing on competition; and (5) the 
existence of “reasonable legal certainty” with regard to 
treatment of customer positions, funds, and property in the 
event of a clearing organization or member’s insolvency.69 
The statute further emphasizes the importance of central 
clearing by authorizing the Financial Regulators to prescribe 
rules that “prevent evasions of the mandatory clearing 
requirements[.]”70 Where a product type should be subject to 
mandatory clearing, but there is no eligible organization 
listing the product, the Financial Regulators are allowed to 
instead mitigate the risk by requiring that parties retain 
additional margin or capital.71 These fallback requirements 
are meant to serve dual purposes: protecting parties from 
credit risk and encouraging the market to consider centrally 
clearing products that it may not have otherwise.  
In summary, the statutory structure reflects the Senate’s 
policy preference for mandatory central clearing. Title VII’s 
primary means of regulation—the mandatory clearing 
determinations and the two procedures set out for reviewing 
product types (by submission process and commission-
initiated review)—ensure that the Financial Regulators will 
consider all derivative products for mandatory clearing. The 
 
68 Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,603 (July 13, 2012) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
69 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(4)(B) (2012).  
70 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(4)(A) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(d)(1) (2012).  
71 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(4)(B)(iii) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(d)(2)(C) (2012).  
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fallback regulatory options of increased margin and capital 
requirements are included to address the risk presented by 
products that are not suitable for central clearing, but the 
increased costs also intend to prod the market toward 
standardization and clearing where possible. 
2. International Consensus on Mandatory 
Central Clearing 
The Title VII approach is similar to policy decisions made 
concurrently in the international financial community. In 
2009, the Group of Twenty (“G20”)72 agreed to clear all 
standardized OTC derivatives and attach higher capital 
requirements to those that remained uncleared.73 The 
Financial Stability Board, an international financial 
monitoring organization, affirmed the international 
undertaking in its October 2010 report on Implementing OTC 
Derivatives Market Reforms, and the G20 reiterated its goal 
at a November 2011 summit.74 A February 2012 report from 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(“IOSCO”) followed, recommending specific policy approaches 
that would help achieve the goals of mandatory central 
clearing.75 G20 members then began implementing such 
 
72 The G20 is an international organization that provides a forum for 
the largest advanced and emerging economies to meet and discuss financial 
regulation and the global economy. See Grp. of Twenty, About G20, 
G20.ORG, http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/ [perma.cc/L3JP-2HF8]. The G20 
members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and the European Union. Grp. of Twenty, G20 Members, G20.ORG, 
http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/ [perma.cc/4Y55-4E5D].  
73 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,286 (Dec. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
39, 50).  
74 See id. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., IMPLEMENTING OTC 
DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_101025.pdf [perma.cc/WL2H-Z4PZ].  
75 See TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REQUIREMENTS 
FOR MANDATORY CLEARING (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter IOSCO REPORT].  
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regulations.76 The Senate expressly considered the 
international consensus while developing Title VII’s 
framework.77 In discussing the clearing requirement’s 
centrality to the regulatory framework, the Senate report 
even quoted a G20 steering group letter: “[s]tandardized over-
the-counter derivatives contracts should be . . . where 
appropriate, cleared through central clearing counterparties 
by 2012 at the latest[.]”78 Accordingly, this international 
context should inform any interpretation of the goals and 
intent of Title VII’s statutory and regulatory scheme.  
The IOSCO report asks “whether a mandatory clearing 
obligation should apply to a [given] product or set of products” 
as the threshold question in a mandatory clearing regime.79 
In making this determination, IOSCO recommended that 
authorities utilize both a “bottom-up approach,” which 
determines mandatory clearing obligations for products 
proposed for clearing by a central clearinghouse, and a “top-
down approach,” under which the regulator examines 
products that central clearinghouses are not currently 
clearing or seeking to clear.80 
For several reasons, the bottom-up approach is useful as a 
starting point.81 As central clearinghouses identify new 
products they wish to clear, their applications for 
authorization to clear these products initiates review for a 
mandatory clearing determination.82 Bottom-up review also 
jump-starts the process by focusing central regulators’ initial 
attention on products for which voluntary central clearing is 
already a commercial option. If some market participants 
choose not to voluntarily centrally clear, these submissions 
(and subsequent determinations) will quickly reduce the 
 
76 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,286.  
77 S. REP. No. 111–176, at 32 (2010).  
78 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
79 IOSCO REPORT, supra note 75, at 5. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 13. 
82 Id. at 12. 
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number of uncleared trades by establishing an obligation to 
do so. 
Top-down review remains necessary alongside the 
submission process, though, because without it, there is no 
review of OTC derivatives that no clearinghouse seeks to 
clear. Absent such review, the market—rather than central 
regulators—will choose when submissions are made and will 
therefore determine which products are potentially subject to 
the central clearing mandate.83 Further, a system without 
top-down review would limit agencies’ ability to review new 
products as they emerge in the market, instead leaving the 
agency to wait for a central clearinghouse that wishes to clear 
(and therefore initiate review).84 By utilizing both processes—
IOSCO’s recommended approach—regulators instead review 
the entire OTC derivatives market, ensuring they can flexibly 
account for the “continuing and dynamic evolution of the 
range of products[.]”85 
As discussed in Part II.C.1 above, Title VII establishes a 
regulatory framework aligned with these IOSCO 
recommendations. The submission processes are the bottom-
up approach, which is supplemented by the top-down 
commission-initiated review. In this manner, Congress’ 
choices reflect an understanding of the international 
consensus regarding both methods’ importance. 
D. The Financial Regulators’ Implementation of The 
 
83 See id. at 24 (“Under the top-down approach, a determining 
authority identifies products that it deems may be suitable for mandatory 
clearing based on the criteria within its jurisdiction even though there may 
be no [central clearing party] clearing or seeking to clear that particular 
product.”). 
84 See id. at 11 (“As new OTC derivative products emerge or existing 
products and [central clearing party] coverage of existing products change, 
products may be determined to be subject to a mandatory clearing obligation 
as deemed appropriate by the determining authority. This enables 
authorities to respond to developments in the OTC derivatives markets and 
to adapt mandatory clearing obligations accordingly.”). 
85 Id. 
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Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act 
Despite identical statutory language, the CFTC and SEC 
approached implementation in dramatically different 
manners.86 The CFTC promulgated rules governing the 
submission process and commission-initiated review in 
2011.87 In 2012, it used these processes to determine that 
certain classes of interest-rate swaps and CDSs would be 
subject to the central clearing requirement.88 Ongoing CFTC 
review since 2012 supplemented these initial determinations 
and added to the mandatory clearing rules accordingly.89 
The SEC has taken “a slower, more deliberate approach to 
rulemaking.”90 In 2011, the SEC issued an Exemptive Order 
granting private actors temporary relief from compliance with 
certain provisions until the SEC was able to produce its 
regulations.91 In 2012, an SEC timeline for the promulgation 
of final rules under Dodd-Frank regulating security-based 
swaps noted that a proposed rule had already set forth the 
expected submission process for security-based swaps.92 This 
 
86 See infra Figure 2. 
87 See generally Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 
76 Fed. Reg. 44,464 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140). 
88 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,287 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 39, 50) (using submissions from clearing organizations to establish the 
central clearing mandate). 
89 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,202, 
71,226 (Oct. 14, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50) (expanding the central 
clearing obligation to additional classes of interest rate swaps). 
90 Julian E. Hammar, David B. Lichtstein & Robert J. Dilworth, The 
SEC’s Long-Awaited Security-Based Swaps Rules May Be Approaching, 50 
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 77, 78 (2017). 
91 See generally Temporary Exemptions and Other Temporary Relief, 
Together with Information on Compliance Dates for New Provisions of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Applicable to Security-Based Swaps, 76 
Fed. Reg. 36,287 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
92 See Statement of General Policy on the Sequencing of the 
Compliance Dates for Final Rules Applicable to Security-Based Swaps 
Adopted Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
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rule was finalized a month later,93 but the earlier timeline 
also clarified that submissions and determinations would not 
begin until other necessary rules were also finalized.94 As of 
this publication, the SEC has neither begun submissions of 
security-based swaps for review nor determined that any 
products must be centrally cleared.95 
1. The CFTC Takes Action 
Title VII grants the CFTC jurisdiction over swaps, a subset 
of OTC derivatives estimated to make up approximately 
ninety percent of the market.96 This significant portion of 
OTC derivatives includes CDSs on broad-based security 
indices, one of the classes of OTC derivatives which 
prominently impacted the market during the 2008 financial 
crisis.97 Due to the scope of the CFTC’s responsibility, 
 
35,625, 35,626 (June 14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“[T]he 
[SEC] . . . has proposed . . . [r]ules relating to mandatory clearing of 
[security-based] swaps that would specify the process for a registered 
clearing agency’s submission for review of [security-based] swaps that the 
clearing agency plans to accept for clearing[.]”). 
93 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602 (July 13, 2012). 
94 See Statement of General Policy on the Sequencing of the 
Compliance Dates for Final Rules Applicable to Security-Based Swaps 
Adopted Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
35,634–36. 
95 See Hammar et al., supra note 90, at 77; see also Joanna Wright, 
SEC Finally Moves Forward on Single-Name CDS Dealer Rules, RISK.NET 
(Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.risk.net/regulation/6007591/sec-finally-moves-
forward-on-single-name-cds-dealer-rules [https://perma.cc/3C8C-WW5N] 
(noting that while the SEC is working towards finalization of other Title VII 
rules, Commissioner Hester Peirce, when asked about “a rule for mandatory 
clearing of single-name credit-default swap products, Pierce said only that 
the SEC has not yet proposed such a rule”). 
96 Hammar et al., supra note 90, at 78. 
97 See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and 
“Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap 
Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,308 (Aug. 13, 2012) (to 
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including jurisdiction over a product type under a significant 
amount of political scrutiny, the agency moved quickly to 
implement its response.98 
In 2011, the CFTC promulgated the CFTC Process Rule, 
establishing operational processes for swap submissions and 
the CFTC’s factors for determining whether swaps should be 
subject to a central clearing requirement.99 Under this rule, 
swap submissions: (1) are made by any derivatives clearing 
organization that plans to accept the product for clearing; and 
(2) must include information that will enable the CFTC to 
evaluate the five Dodd-Frank criteria for mandatory 
clearing.100 The CFTC makes each submission publicly 
available for comment and reviews the submission and 
comments thereon.101 The CFTC then makes a mandatory 
clearing determination within ninety days of the 
submission.102 
The CFTC Process Rule also provides procedures for top-
down review.103 Commission-initiated review occurs on an 
ongoing basis for “swaps that have not been accepted for 
clearing by a derivatives clearing organization” to determine 
whether they should be subject to required clearing.104 This 
review looks to information acquired from swap data 
 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1); CFTC Clearing Requirement Determination 
Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,287 (Dec. 13, 2012) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50). 
98 See Hammar et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
99 See Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 44,464 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140). 
100 See 17 C.F.R. § 39.5(b)(3)(ii) (2018) (“The submission . . . shall 
include . . . [a] statement that includes, but is not limited to, information 
that will assist the [CFTC] in making a quantitative and qualitative 
assessment of the following factors . . . .”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) 
(2012) (containing the five criteria for review). 
101 See id. § 39.5(b)(5) (“The submission will be made available to the 
public and posted on the [CFTC] Web site for a 30-day public comment 
period.”). 
102 See id. § 39.5(b)(6) (“The [CFTC] will make its determination not 
later than 90 days after a complete submission has been received, unless 
the submitting derivatives clearing organization agrees to an extension.”). 
103 See id. § 39.5(c). 
104 See id. § 39.5(c)(1). 
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repositories, swap dealers, and other entities involved in the 
market.105 While the rule does not provide any timeframe for 
review, it requires that any determination made under 
commission-initiated review be made public and available for 
comment.106 
After a year and a half, these processes resulted in the 
Initial CFTC Clearing Mandate.107 This rule requires central 
clearing for interest rate swaps and CDSs with certain 
specifications.108 Derivative clearinghouses voluntarily 
cleared these covered products prior to the rule, and, in fact, 
the CFTC made its determinations based on submissions from 
derivative clearing organizations currently clearing those 
swaps.109 The CFTC chose these classes in part because the 
new obligation would cover a significant portion of the market, 
but also “because these swaps [were] currently being cleared,” 
so the initial requirement would not disrupt the market 
unnecessarily.110 The agency acknowledged, though, that this 
rule was only a preliminary step; since “swap clearing is likely 
to evolve,” later determinations “may be based on a variety of 
other factors beyond the extent to which the swaps in question 
are already being cleared.”111 As predicted, the later 
 
105 Id. 
106 See Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 44,464, 44,469 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140) 
(“[The CFTC] will make such determinations on a case-by-case basis, after 
taking into consideration any comments received pursuant to the 30-day 
public comment period[.]”); 17 C.F.R. § 39.5(c)(2) (2018) (“Notice regarding 
any determination . . . will be made available to the public and posted on 
the [CFTC] Web site for a 30-day public comment period.”). 
107 See generally Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 
2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 39, 50). 
108 See 17 C.F.R. § 50.4 (2018). 
109 See CFTC Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) 
of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,287 (“The [CFTC] received submissions 
relating to CDS and interest rate swaps . . . . The clearing requirement 
determinations and rules adopted in this release cover certain CDS and 
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Additional CFTC Clearing Mandate (promulgated in 2016) 
included swaps submitted by clearing organizations that 
wished to clear the products, but which were not yet centrally 
cleared.112 
2. The SEC’s Deliberate Approach 
Under Title VII, the SEC’s jurisdiction covers security-
based swaps, which account for most of the ten percent of OTC 
derivatives not under the CFTC’s jurisdiction.113 Among other 
product types, security-based swaps include equity swaps and 
single name CDSs.114 With less of the market share to cover, 
the SEC understandably approached implementation more 
slowly than the CFTC. As a result, much of the SEC’s Title 
VII rulemaking currently remains only proposed or is 
finalized with delayed compliance dates.115 
The SEC first produced a timeline for efficient and 
undisruptive Title VII implementation.116 A rule specifying 
 
112 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,202, 
71,206 (Oct. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
113 See Hammar et al., supra note 90, at 78. Title VII also envisioned 
the existence of “mixed swaps,” products with criteria that overlap between 
swaps and security-based swaps and which were subject to joint CFTC and 
SEC jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(8) (2012) (“The Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, after consultation with the Board of Governors, shall jointly 
prescribe such regulations regarding mixed swaps . . . as may be necessary 
to carry out the purposes of this title.”); see also Hammar et al., supra note 
90, at 78. Accordingly, swaps and security-based swaps together do not 
amount to one hundred percent of the OTC derivatives market. While the 
Financial Regulators have promulgated regulations regarding mixed swaps, 
this joint jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses 
specifically on security-based swaps. See generally Regulation of Mixed 
Swaps, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a68-4 (2018). 
114 Hammar et al., supra note 90, at 78. 
115 Id. at 81–82 (citing, inter alia, Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/implementation-of-dodd-frank-
act.shtml [https://perma.cc/MQ74-UMPK] (last modified June 21, 2018)). 
116 See Statement of General Policy on the Sequencing of the 
Compliance Dates for Final Rules Applicable to Security-Based Swaps 
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the submission process for security-based swaps was already 
proposed,117 and the timeline noted that such a rule could be 
adopted without any additional prior action.118 However, 
regardless of whether these procedures were to be established 
in the near future, security-based swaps would not be 
mandatorily cleared until after the later of: 
(1) The compliance date of certain of the final rules 
resulting from the Clearing Agency Standards 
Proposing Release; (2) the compliance date of final 
rules resulting from the End-User Clearing Exception 
Proposing Release; and (3) the [SEC] determining 
whether to propose amendments to the existing net 
capital and customer protection requirements 
applicable to broker-dealers with regard to [security-
based] swap clearing through such-broker dealers and 
whether to address portfolio margining with swaps.119 
Six years later, the SEC still has not taken some of these 
preliminary steps, and as a result, the agency has not begun 
accepting submissions for mandatory clearing 
determinations. The Clearing Agency Standards Proposing 
Release resulted in one final rule on its central topic, but the 
SEC pushed a number of other rules proposed in the release 
to a later date, and many are still not finalized.120 Similarly, 
 
Adopted Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
35,625, 35,627–28 (June 14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“[T]he 
[SEC] seeks to sequence the implementation of the final rules to be adopted 
pursuant to Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act in an appropriate manner.”).  
117 Id. at 35,626 (“[T]he [SEC] . . . has proposed . . . [r]ules relating to 
mandatory clearing of [security-based] swaps that would specify the process 
for a registered clearing agency’s submission for review of [security-based] 
swaps that the clearing agency plans to accept for clearing[.]”). 
118 Id. at 35,635 (“[T]he [SEC] believes it may be appropriate for the 
procedural rules related to mandatory clearing determinations to be 
adopted before the rules further defining the terms ‘swap,’ ‘security-based 
swap,’ ‘security-based swap agreement,’ and ‘mixed swap’ are adopted 
and/or effective or before the Cross-Border Rules are proposed.”). 
119 Id. 
120 See Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,220, 66,220–23 
(Nov. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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while the SEC proposed the End-User Clearing Exception in 
2010, it still has not finalized the rule.121 
Although the SEC is not accepting submissions, it finalized 
the SEC Process Rule (which specifies the mechanism for 
submissions that would be used) shortly after the timeline’s 
release.122 As under the CFTC Process Rule, the SEC Process 
Rule obligates registered clearing agencies to submit any 
security-based swap they plan to accept for clearing.123 Each 
submission must contain certain information to assist the 
SEC in evaluating the five factors from Title VII.124 However, 
unlike the CFTC, the SEC included no timeframe within 
which review must be conducted or a determination must be 
issued.125 
Further, the SEC’s general approach differed from the 
CFTC’s structure significantly: neither the SEC Process 
Rule—nor any other SEC release—provided insight into the 
SEC’s operation of commission-initiated review.126 In the 
Exemptive Order, the SEC categorizes Title VII’s requirement 
of commission-initiated review as “Authorizes /Directs [SEC] 
Action,”127 correctly indicating that the statutory provision 
 
121 See End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Security-Based 
Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 79,992 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240). 
122 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602 (July 13, 2012) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
123 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(o)(1) (2018). 
124 See id. § 240.19b-4(o)(2)–(3); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(4)(B) 
(2012) (containing the five factors to consider in review). 
125 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(o). 
126 See generally Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based 
Swaps for Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing 
Agencies; Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable 
to All Self-Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602 (July 13, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
127 See Temporary Exemptions and Other Temporary Relief, Together 
with Information on Compliance Dates for New Provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Applicable to Security-Based Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 
36,287, 36,290 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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requires the SEC, not market participants, to act.128 
Accordingly, the provision does not require compliance by 
relevant financial institutions “unless the relevant [SEC] 
action already has been undertaken.”129 Until the SEC takes 
actions implementing this top-down review, regulated entities 
(like those listed in the CFTC Process Rule) will have no 
established role in providing data to inform clearing 
determinations, will receive no formal opportunity to 
comment on the decision-making process, and will have no 
guidance on if, or how, such determinations will be made in 
the future. 
The SEC Process Rule does briefly mention commission-
initiated review.130 When discussing the background to Dodd-
Frank and the regulatory approaches prescribed in Title VII, 
the SEC mentions in a footnote that “[t]he Dodd-Frank Act 
does not require rulemaking with respect to Commission-
initiated Reviews.”131 In response to a comment requesting 
that the SEC follow the CFTC’s approach and promulgate 
rules on the subject, the SEC makes the same point; no 
further explanation is provided.132 The SEC merely adds that 
“staff are in the process of determining how these reviews will 
proceed . . . and whether any rulemaking related to these 
reviews is necessary, either now or in the future.”133 Despite 
this claim, there has been no proposed or finalized rule in the 
time since the SEC Process Rule first referenced commission-
initiated review of security-based swaps.134 Additionally, the 
SEC’s online summary of Dodd-Frank implementation does 
 
128 Id. at 36,291 n.36. 
129 Id. 
130 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(o) (2018). 
131 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,604 n.16 (July 13, 2012) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
132 Id. at 41,616 (“The [SEC] notes that the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
require rulemaking regarding Commission-initiated Reviews.”). 
133 Id. 
134 See generally 77–82 Fed. Reg. (2012–2017). 
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not indicate that any rule on commission-initiated review is 
proposed or expected.135 
 
Figure 2. CFTC and SEC Approaches to Mandatory 
Central Clearing136 
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III. THE REGULATORY HOLE CREATED BY THE 
SEC’S APPROACH 
The SEC’s careful approach to initiating security-based 
swap submissions is understandable. Delaying 
implementation of the mandate until all relevant rules are 
finalized allows the SEC to avoid unnecessary market 
 
135 See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/implementation-of-dodd-frank-act.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/MQ74-UMPK] (last modified June 21, 2018).  
136 See supra Sections II.D.1–2. 
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disruptions and learn from the CFTC’s missteps.137 As 
discussed above, the SEC did not share the CFTC’s political 
pressures to act quickly.138 Although considerable time will 
have passed since Dodd-Frank’s enactment once mandatory 
central clearing of security-based swaps begins, the statute 
itself grants the SEC the flexibility to sequence effective dates 
of rulemakings to minimize problems.139 
While the SEC’s timing may not raise concerns, the 
substantive differences between the CFTC’s and SEC’s 
implementation of the central clearing mandate highlight 
serious issues. As discussed in Part II, Dodd-Frank provides 
two options for the Financial Regulators’ use in making 
mandatory clearing determinations: the bottom-up 
submission process and the top-down commission-initiated 
review.140 While the CFTC successfully began regulating OTC 
derivatives under its jurisdiction using the submission 
process, the agency’s rulemakings specify that commission-
initiated review will also be used when necessitated by 
changes in the market. Considering the nature of security-
based swap products, the SEC’s failure to provide similar 
guidance undermines the effective regulation envisioned by 
the statute. 
A. Security-Based Swaps Are Not Suitable for a 
Submission-Only Process 
By its nature, the SEC’s submission process will only 
review those security-based swaps that are already 
voluntarily cleared or that central clearinghouses wish to 
clear in the future. The SEC has not explicitly argued that this 
 
137 Hammar et al., supra note 90, at 81 (“This [slower approach] 
allowed [the SEC] to take account of the CFTC experience[.]”). 
138 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text; supra Section II.D.2. 
139 See Temporary Exemptions and Other Temporary Relief, Together 
with Information on Compliance Dates for New Provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Applicable to Security-Based Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 
36,287, 36,289 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“Title 
VII provides the [SEC] with flexibility to establish effective dates beyond 
the minimum 60 days specified therein[.]”). 
140 See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text. 
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approach is preferable, and has given no explanation as to 
why it is taking this approach.141 However, there is no 
indication in any of the SEC’s regulations or guidance that 
commission-initiated review will be added to the regulatory 
scheme later or that the submissions process is intended as a 
stopgap until commission-initiated review begins.142 
This submission-only method is poorly suited to security-
based swaps, which include a substantial number of product 
types that are currently uncleared. The SEC is aware of this 
reality, noting in the SEC Process Rule that “many security-
based swap transactions are still ineligible for central 
clearing.”143 At the time when the various OTC derivatives 
were defined as security-based swaps, only CDS products 
were voluntarily cleared by industry participants. Of those, 
ninety-one percent of index CDS products were accepted for 
clearing, but only thirty-three percent of single-name CDS 
were clearable at 2011 year-end.144 An even smaller 
proportion of each product—fifty-seven percent of index CDS 
and twenty-five percent of single-name—were actually 
cleared.145 According to this data, a significant percentage of 
the only clearable class of security-based swaps could not be 
cleared at finalization of the SEC Process Rule. 
The proportion of security-based swaps voluntarily cleared 
has not increased meaningfully since. According to the Bank 
for International Settlements’ most recent data, covering the 
first half of 2017, central counterparties account for slightly 
 
141 See supra Section II.D.2. 
142 See supra Section II.D.2. The SEC’s choice to bury discussion of 
possible commission-initiated review in a footnote in the SEC Process 
Rule—and to relegate use of such review to agency discretion, abandoning 
public consideration of the possibility—strongly indicates that any hope the 
SEC will change course soon is misplaced. 
143 Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,636 (July 13, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
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more than half of the gross outstanding notional amount of 
index CDSs, and around thirty percent of the gross 
outstanding notional amount in single-name CDSs.146 The 
amount of equity OTC derivatives traded with central 
counterparties remains negligible.147 Unsurprisingly, 
considering the SEC’s regulatory stagnancy during the 
intervening time, it appears that the market’s central clearing 
of security-based swaps remains unchanged. 
As a result, a majority of security-based swaps currently 
traded in the market would not be subject to SEC review 
under the submission-only approach established by the SEC 
Process Rule. This would not change unless central 
clearinghouses decided to begin offering clearing services for 
previously uncleared security-based swaps, triggering 
submissions on those products. Similarly, new security-based 
swap products emerging in the market would not be subject to 
SEC review unless a central clearing party wished to offer 
clearing services for it. In both cases, though, industry 
participants—and not the Financial Regulators—would 
control which products could potentially be included in the 
central clearing mandate. 
B. One Size Does Not Fit All: The CFTC’s Approach 
 
146 Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics, Global OTC Derivatives 
Market: Commodity Contracts, Credit Default Swaps, BANK OF INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/tseries/OTC_DERIV/H:N:A: 
Y:R:A:A:5A:5J?t=D5.2&p=20171&i=28.4&x=OD_CPARTY.5.CL_OD_CPA
RTY&o=s:line,z:3 [perma.cc/S2JW-3JNS] (showing number of Index CDS 
trades with central clearing parties); Semiannual OTC Derivatives 
Statistics, Global OTC Derivatives Market: Commodity Contracts, Credit 
Default Swaps, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs 
/tseries/OTC_DERIV/H:N:D:Y:N:A:A:5A:5J?t=D5.2&p=20171&i=26.8&x=
OD_CPARTY.5.CL_OD_CPARTY&o=s:line,z:3 [perma.cc/X8VS-QBSK] 
(showing number of single-name CDS trades with central clearing parties). 
147 Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics, Global OTC Derivatives 
Market: Commodity Contracts, Foreign Exchange, Interest Rate, Equity 
Linked Contracts, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/d5.1 [perma.cc/UZ3K-J7SW] (showing 
equity trades with central counterparties). 
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Does Not Work for the SEC 
Although the SEC has not attempted to justify its planned 
treatment of commission-initiated review, it may argue that 
the CFTC’s success in implementing the central clearing 
mandate illustrates that the commission-initiated review 
option is unnecessary. Both CFTC rules implementing the 
central clearing requirement were promulgated on the basis 
of swap submissions rather than through top-down agency 
review.148 Some observers note that the SEC’s slower 
regulatory approach allows it to learn from the CFTC’s 
choices, and tailor its rules accordingly.149 As part of this 
deliberate strategy, the SEC could claim it consciously decided 
to forego commission-initiated review because the CFTC has 
not yet found use for it. 
This decision would be a critical regulatory misstep for 
three important reasons. First, security-based swaps are 
currently less likely to be voluntarily cleared or even clearable 
with central clearing parties. Second, industry participants 
generally consider security-based swaps less appropriate for 
clearing and are therefore less likely to pursue voluntary 
clearing of security-based swaps without regulatory 
encouragement. And third, the CFTC’s approach took 
advantage of existing regulatory incentives to push the 
market towards voluntary clearing; without commission-
initiated review, the SEC will struggle to benefit from similar 
forces. 
1. Current Clearing of Security-Based Swaps 
Limit Submissions’ Effectiveness 
The CFTC’s use of submissions was particularly effective 
because most of the swaps market was already clearable at 
the time of the clearing requirement determinations. The 
 
148 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,287 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 39, 50); Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,202, 
71,205–06 (Oct. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
149 See Hammar et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
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Initial CFTC Clearing Mandate estimated that the interest 
rate swaps covered therein made up about three quarters of 
the swaps market’s outstanding notional exposure.150 That 
rule covered other types of swaps as well, and the 2016 
regulation added further product classes.151 Since all of these 
types of swaps were reviewed pursuant to central clearing 
parties’ submissions, it is reasonable to conclude that a 
majority of the swap market was voluntarily cleared (or 
central clearing parties sought to offer voluntary clearing) at 
the time of the determinations. 
By contrast, security-based swaps are not voluntarily 
cleared in any significant volume. In 2012, when the SEC 
promulgated the SEC Process Rule, security-based swaps 
were not only largely uncleared, they were generally 
unclearable through central clearing parties—no such party 
accepted them for voluntary clearing.152 As discussed above in 
Part II.A, these numbers have not considerably changed, and 
so a major portion of the current security-based swaps market 
remains unreviewable through a submission-only process. 
2. Market Purposes for Security-Based Swaps 
Encourage Inertia 
More crucially, the current, limited state of security-based 
swaps clearing is likely to continue absent external forces on 
the market. According to the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) and a variety of other 
industry associations and regulators, a “substantial portion” 
of the OTC derivatives market is likely to remain uncleared 
 
150 Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,287. 
151 See id. at 74,284; Clearing Requirement Determination Under 
Section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps, 81 
Fed. Reg. 71,202, 71,202 (Oct. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
152 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,638 tbl.1 (July 13, 2012); 
see also supra Section III.A. 
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moving forward.153 This segment is primarily composed of 
security-based swaps, including the majority of single-name 
credit default swaps and many equity swaps.154 
ISDA’s explanations for why security-based swaps are 
often uncleared illustrate why the market is unlikely to 
unilaterally adopt voluntary clearing. These products are less 
amenable to central clearing for several reasons, including 
end-users’ needs for tailored, bespoke products, particularly 
for hedging or risk management purposes; lack of product 
standardization; lack of clearinghouse capability;155 and lack 
of liquidity.156 While industry focus and investment could 
solve some of these issues, security-based swaps’ popularity as 
bespoke hedging products makes it unlikely that market 
participants will devote resources to solving the problem on 
their own. According to ISDA, requiring hedging parties to use 
standardized products would force them to “employ imperfect 
or unsuitable hedges . . . [with] unwanted basis risk.”157 
Further, standardization would potentially restrict 
 
153 See generally INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, NON-CLEARED OTC 
DERIVATIVES: THEIR IMPORTANCE TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 4 (Mar. 2013) 
[hereinafter ISDA REPORT] (discussing similar observations made by the 
Financial Security Board, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
Board of Governors of the International Organizations of Securities 
Commissions, and the International Monetary Fund). 
154 Id. (“ISDA estimates the non-cleared OTC derivatives market will 
consist of the following: [s]everal large, relatively broad market segments, 
including the majority of . . . single-name credit default swaps and various 
types of equity . . . swaps[.]”). 
155 Clearinghouse capability could likely be voluntarily developed. 
However, without a market for voluntary clearing, it is unlikely 
clearinghouses will develop this capability; at the same time, the lack of 
ready-and-waiting clearinghouse ability will limit market interest in taking 
the needed steps to render products clearable. This feedback loop—along 
with the other factors listed—leaves it unlikely the private market will 
move towards voluntary clearing without an external stimulus. 
156 Id. at 10–12. As explained in Section II.A, supra, establishing a 
perfect hedge requires tailoring the derivative transaction to the underlying 
security. Even where not attempting to use swaps for hedging purposes, the 
bespoke nature of many OTC derivatives is useful to market participants 
who wish to create a specific, niche risk profile. See supra notes 33–35 and 
accompanying text. 
157 ISDA REPORT, supra note 153, at 5. 
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transactions from qualifying for hedge accounting treatment, 
“introduc[ing] significant volatility to [hedging parties’] 
income statements.”158 If the popular industry belief is that 
voluntarily cleared security-based swaps will not fulfill 
parties’ purposes, it is doubtful that market participants will 
spend time and money pursuing voluntary clearing of any 
security-based swaps unless forced to do so. 
3. Lack of Regulatory Incentives Will Promote 
Continuation of the Status Quo 
Finally, without a commission-initiated review option, it is 
unclear how the SEC plans to incentivize voluntary clearing—
the first step in the mandatory central clearing process under 
a submission-only scheme. In a fully operative Title VII 
regulatory regime, the SEC would review security-based swap 
products and potentially subject them to the central clearing 
requirement regardless of whether market participants 
voluntarily clear such products. In such circumstances, 
industry members would have the opportunity to avoid 
unnecessary costs and disruptions to their trading by making 
products more suitable for clearing in advance of an SEC 
determination. 
The CFTC’s submission-focused approach benefitted from 
a general market understanding that mandatory central 
clearing would soon be implemented for swaps.159 The CFTC 
Process Rule’s inclusion of specific commission-initiated 
review methods bolstered this expectation, even though they 
have not been used. While ISDA noted that increased central 
clearing began before the financial crisis,160 this shift 
accelerated following the industry commitment to “broaden 
the range of cleared swaps and market participants.”161 
 
158 Id. 
159 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
160 Id. at 7 (“To summarize, the trend toward central clearing predates 
the financial crisis and has accelerated since the crisis.”). 
161 Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,296 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 39, 50). 
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Industry members began to change their approach in direct 
response to “key concerns raised by supervisors and 
legislators globally.”162 The CFTC could rely on the 
submission process in the Initial CFTC Clearing Mandate 
specifically because widespread, voluntary swap clearing had 
already taken hold in the market as a response to the threat 
of regulation.163 Similarly, regulators made the Additional 
CFTC Clearing Mandate determination based on submissions 
of types of swaps then uncleared by the submitting 
organizations, but which the organizations wished to 
voluntarily clear moving forward.164 Without any risk of top-
down CFTC review of these products (i.e., without a potential 
clearing obligation), it is unclear whether industry 
participants would have unilaterally standardized and 
cleared them. 
As security-based swaps are less likely than swaps to be 
voluntarily cleared or clearable, incentivizing voluntary 
clearing is essential to the SEC’s mandatory clearing process. 
Exemplifying the impact such incentives could have, major 
buy-side firms have already committed to voluntarily clear the 
one security-based swap product that the eventual central 
clearing requirement will certainly cover—liquid single-name 
CDS.165 Such a voluntary move is unlikely to occur in the 
 
162 Letter from Senior Mgmts. of Dealers & Buy-Side Insts. to William 
C. Dudley, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (June 2, 2009), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/market
s/2009/060209letter.pdf [perma.cc/DK7K-EBJV]. 
163 See Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 44,464, 44,469 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140) 
(“The [CFTC] anticipates that the initial mandatory clearing 
determinations would only involve swaps that are either already being 
cleared or that a [derivatives clearing organization] wants to clear.”); see 
also Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 
77 Fed. Reg. at 74,287 (noting the swaps covered under the Initial CFTC 
Clearing Mandate were “currently being cleared”). 
164 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,202, 
71,206 (Oct. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
165 See Press Release, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 25 Investment 
Management Firms Commit to Single-Name CDS Clearing (Dec. 16, 2015), 
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market for other products, though; as discussed above, 
bespoke security-based swaps’ usefulness for hedging 
purposes—and the broader popularity of their bilaterally 
negotiated nature—makes it unlikely parties will abandon 
these products.166 Considering that standardization would 
sacrifice this utility, it would be a poor plan to rely on industry 
members expending their own resources to find ways to 
standardize these products.167 Making it inevitable that the 
central clearing mandate will reach currently unclearable 
products is the most effective way to push the market toward 
voluntary clearing. But under the submission-only processes 
in the SEC Process Rule, this regulatory incentive is 
conspicuously absent. 
While the margin requirements for uncleared security-
based swaps may help fill this void, ISDA finds this 
unlikely.168 The report notes that margin requirements 
“which are intended to incentivize central clearing will not 
achieve the objective . . . but will simply dissuade derivatives 
users from engaging in otherwise economically useful 
investment or risk-hedging activity.”169 Without additional 
incentives, the increased cost of trading uncleared products 
alone is not enough to counteract the significant market 
tendency against central clearing of security-based swaps. 
Between the current uncleared nature of many security-
based swaps, the lack of market interest in voluntary clearing, 
and the absence of regulatory incentives pushing industry 
members to pursue voluntary clearing moving forward, it is 
difficult to see how the SEC’s submission-only process will 
succeed. Unless the SEC adjusts its approach, many of the 




166 See supra Section III.B.3. 
167 As private firms would need to expend their own resources 
developing a fix that would then be used by (and, through regulation, 
required of) the rest of the industry, it would be a poor business decision to 
voluntarily pursue standardization without any cost-sharing mechanism. 
168 See ISDA REPORT, supra note 153, at 16.  
169 Id. 
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mandatory central clearing. Although the CFTC’s 
submissions-only approach has been successful in the swaps 
market, the SEC must take a unique approach to cover the 
specific market under its control. 
C. Mandatory Central Clearing: The SEC’s Obligation 
to Implement Congress’ Intent 
Considering the legislative intent discussed in Subsection 
II.B.1, the SEC’s approach clearly undermines Title VII’s 
purposes.170 Congress intended Dodd-Frank to mitigate the 
systemic risk of the OTC derivatives market with close, 
ongoing review of the market and widespread central clearing 
implemented pursuant to such review.171 By excluding active 
top-down review, the SEC impeded its own ability to review a 
significant portion of the market it was meant to regulate. 
More dangerously, the SEC has abdicated its responsibility to 
make central clearing determinations, only becoming involved 
when market participants initiate the process with voluntary 
clearing. By allowing financial institutions to determine 
whether mandatory central clearing of security-based swaps 
occurs, the SEC has undermined a core provision of Dodd-
Frank’s regulatory scheme. 
Some Dodd-Frank critics may see the SEC’s lack of 
effective central clearing as a positive development. Once 
global regulatory discussions began focusing on mandatory 
central clearing as a potential response to the financial crisis, 
many academics took aim at the concept’s effectiveness as a 
risk-mitigation device.172 Such concerns were significant 
 
170 See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra Section II.C.1. 
172 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic 
Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 1291, 1294 (2014) (“[R]ecent scholarship shows that mandatory 
clearing is no panacea for systemic risk, and once it is imposed on a globally 
uniform basis, its flaws will be unchecked, rendering the global financial 
system uniformly vulnerable.); Yuliya Guseva, Destructive Collectivism: 
Dodd-Frank Coordination and Clearinghouses, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 
1715 (2016) (“[T]he centralized clearing of OTC derivatives . . . may be 
unduly overrated.”); Hester Peirce, Derivatives Clearinghouses: Clearing the 
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enough for the SEC to note them in the SEC Process Rule.173 
Scholar and now-SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce effectively 
summarized critics’ most prominent concern, that central 
clearing parties have become “Dodd-Frank’s addition to the 
too-big-to-fail ranks[,]”174 with the risk that “a shuttered 
[central clearing party] could devastate markets[.]”175 With 
such catastrophic potential effects, these critics surely find the 
SEC’s approach—which limits both the coverage of the central 
clearing mandate and the regulatory incentives for private 
parties to pursue voluntary clearing—a welcome respite from 
regulation. 
Unfortunately for these critics, the policy debate ended in 
Congress. Dodd-Frank did not ask the SEC to examine the 
 
Way to Failure, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 589, 589 (2016) (“Risk management by 
clearinghouses and market participants could suffer, and improper risks 
could find their way into clearinghouses. . . . Dodd-Frank’s derivatives 
framework should be reconsidered before it destabilizes the financial 
system.”); Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 
1641, 1641 (“[C]learinghouses are weaker bulwarks against financial 
contagion, financial panic, and systemic risk than is commonly thought. . . . 
[T]hey do little to reduce systemic risk in crisis times.”); Yesha Yadav, The 
Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 
387 (2013) (“If a clearinghouse cannot manage its risks, the consequences 
are invariably systemic and enormously costly to the taxpayer.”). 
173 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,639 (July 13, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (“Others contend that concentrating 
the risk of numerous bilateral counterparties in a single [central clearing 
party] (or a small number of [central clearing parties]) could introduce risks 
and incentives that may not otherwise exist. For example, they believe that 
risk sharing through a central counterparty may encourage excessive risk 
taking if the costs of imprudent decisions by one clearing member are borne 
by other clearing members, and generally would not be more effective in 
mitigating systemic risk than bilateral clearing arrangements between 
individual firms. Moreover, at least one party believes this moral hazard 
problem could be exacerbated to the extent that [central clearing parties] 
are viewed as too important to fail and subject to bailout remedies that 
benefit all [central clearing party] members.”) (internal citations omitted). 
174 Peirce, supra note 172, at 621. 
175 Id. at 647. 
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efficacy of mandatory central clearing and establish its 
processes accordingly. Title VII instead obligates the SEC to 
carry out the goal of mandatory central clearing for OTC 
derivatives.176 While the SEC retains the power to decide that 
some specific products are not suitable for central clearing, it 
cannot wield this authority to undermine Title VII’s overall 
purpose. Once Congress expressed its intent, any internal 
SEC argument over central clearing as a regulatory tool 
should have ended. It is worth noting the SEC appears to 
share this view, as it declined to respond to these concerns 
beyond noting them in the SEC Process Rule.177 
Other clearing skeptics may claim that while the central 
clearing mandate is warranted, the specific characteristics 
that make security-based swaps less likely to be voluntarily 
cleared also make SEC review unnecessary. These critics 
would claim that, even after SEC review, such products would 
not be subject to the central clearing requirement. Several of 
the ISDA report’s reasons why security-based swaps will 
remain uncleared, including insufficient liquidity and lack of 
operational capability,178 are included in the factors Dodd-
Frank requires the SEC to consider when making mandatory 
central clearing determinations.179 Dodd-Frank also 
addresses the serious concern regarding hedging products 
directly through the end-user exception, which exempts non-
financial entities using security-based swaps to mitigate 
commercial risk from the central clearing requirement.180  
 
176 See 15 U.S.C §§ 78c-3(a)–(b) (2012). 
177 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,639 (July 13, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
178 See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text. 
179 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(4)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012) (“[T]he [SEC] shall take 
into account[:] (i) The existence of significant outstanding notional 
exposures, trading liquidity and adequate pricing data. (ii) The availability 
of rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit 
support infrastructure[.]”). 
180 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(g)(1) (2012). As discussed in Section II.D.2., 
supra, the end-user exception will go into effect via an SEC rule which will 
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Although these provisions show Congress’ understanding 
that the OTC derivatives market cannot be regulated with a 
one-size-fits-all approach, they do not allow the SEC to ignore 
sections of the security-based swap market. The SEC may 
eventually determine a specific product type should not be 
subject to the central clearing mandate, but it remains 
imperative that the SEC actually conducts the review leading 
to that determination. As ISDA notes, “contrary to popular 
belief, OTC derivatives with bespoke economic terms can be 
and are cleared.”181 To assume—without investigating—that 
certain products cannot be centrally cleared would preempt 
the precise type of creative solutions for which Congress 
enlisted the SEC’s expertise. And even if the SEC made such 
an assumption regarding currently unclearable security-
based swaps, this approach abandons responsibility for any 
new security-based swap products market participants may 
later create. 
Finally, any argument in favor of the current approach 
underestimates the positive impact of regulatory certainty. 
The market’s awareness of when and how the SEC reviews a 
product—and of when that review will result in obligations for 
private actors—allows the market to function efficiently. 
Citadel LLC, a global investment firm, recently implored the 
SEC to finalize security-based swap rules and implement 
mandatory clearing for commonly traded CDSs in order to 
“provide the market with . . . regulatory certainty.”182 
According to Citadel, the lack of clear guidance and 
predictability has impaired liquidity and participation in the 
market.183 Notably, the SEC’s only discussion of commission-
 
establish a notification procedure for parties who wish to take advantage of 
it. This rule was proposed in 2010 but has not yet been finalized. See SEC 
End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Security-Based Swaps 
(Proposed Rule), 75 Fed. Reg. 79,992 (Dec. 21, 2010). The CFTC equivalent 
rule was finalized in 2012. See 17 C.F.R. § 50.50 (2018). 
181 ISDA REPORT, supra note 153, at 5. 
182 Letter from Adam C. Cooper, Senior Managing Dir. & Chief Legal 
Officer, Citadel, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Feb. 2, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-05-12/s70512-24.pdf [perma.cc/ 
4DU3-VT34]. 
183 Id. at 1. 
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initiated review in the SEC Process Rule was in response to a 
commenter’s similar request for clarity.184 A scheme in which 
the SEC intentionally avoids top-down review of products, 
regardless of the reason, would strip the market of needed 
guidance and certainty. 
IV. JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL OVERSIGHT: 
FORCING THE REGULATOR TO REGULATE 
Unfortunately, convincing the SEC to voluntarily adopt 
Commission-initiated review may prove difficult in the 
current political climate. President Donald Trump has 
expressed disdain for Dodd-Frank generally.185 Republican 
members of the House of Representatives led the passage of a 
2017 bill which would roll back many of Dodd-Frank’s 
financial protections; a more limited version, which does not 
reach the central clearing mandate, was eventually passed 
and signed into law.186 The Treasury Department similarly 
took aim at the statute, citing an extended period of slow 
economic growth,187 and identified mandated clearing of 
derivatives for reexamination “with an eye toward 
 
184 See SEC Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based 
Swaps for Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing 
Agencies; Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable 
to All Self-Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,616 (July 13, 
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
185 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 9, 
2017, 7:22 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/ 
873183401620230144 [perma.cc/N94Z-QK9Z] (“Congratulations to Jeb 
Hensarling & Republicans on successful House vote to repeal major parts of 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial law. GROWTH!”). 
186 For the House bill, see Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 
115th Cong. (2017). For a discussion of the law eventually passed by both 
houses, see Alan Rappeport & Emily Flitter, Congress Approves First Big 
Dodd-Frank Rollback, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/congress-passes-dodd-frank-
rollback-for-smaller-banks.html (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review). 
187 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Releases 
Second Report on the Administration’s Core Principles of Financial 
Regulation (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/sm0173.aspx [perma.cc/QTZ7-RPAA]. 
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maximizing economic growth consistent with taxpayer 
protection.”188 While Democrats now control the House of 
Representatives,189 the significant uncertainty surrounding 
Dodd-Frank’s status in the current administration makes it 
doubtful the SEC will rewrite its approach of its own volition, 
regardless of how crucial such changes are to the statute’s 
efficacy. 
Despite this possible resistance, private actors may be able 
to compel SEC action through other routes. The standard 
approach to raising objections to agency action (or, in this 
case, lack of action) is via suit under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.190 While limited precedent may provide a 
strategic blueprint for a successful case in this situation, 
potential litigants would face significant hurdles both on the 
merits of the argument and questions of standing, so litigation 
may prove difficult. Sympathetic lawmakers, who could assert 
closer oversight from their roles on congressional committees 
and relationships with SEC commissioners, could potentially 
pursue a more productive route. Both avenues may prove 
necessary to draw attention to and fix the SEC’s ineffective 
regulatory structure. 
A. Massachusetts v. EPA: A Framework for Compelling 
Agency Action 
Forcing federal agencies to act when they do not wish to is 
a particularly difficult task under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “an 
 
188 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES 5 (Oct. 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-Capital-Markets-
FINAL-FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/V2V8-JYHB]. 
189 See Phillip Rucker, Matt Viser, Elise Viebeck & Issac Stanley-
Becker, Midterm Elections: Democrats Capture House as GOP Holds Senate, 




190 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (defining the scope of judicial review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act). 
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agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its 
limited resources and personnel to carry out its delegated 
responsibilities.”191 However, agency refusals to initiate 
rulemaking remain subject to judicial review so as to vindicate 
the public’s rights to file petitions for rulemaking and receive 
a public explanation of denials.192 
This judicial review is “‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly 
deferential,’” 193 making it unlikely litigation will succeed, but 
courts have granted relief where the failure to engage in 
rulemaking is clearly in violation of congressional 
instructions. The paradigm case for such relief arose in 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, where the 
Supreme Court required the Environmental Protection 
Agency (the “EPA”) to take regulatory action because the 
Clean Air Act “provides that EPA shall by regulation prescribe 
. . . standards.”194 This language obliged the EPA to release 
standards for air pollutants that may negatively impact public 
health.195 Once such a negative impact was determined, 
failing to regulate was a violation of the statutory mandate, 
unless the EPA was able to provide a reason (in light of the 
statute’s text and purposes) that such inaction was 
preferable.196 Although the EPA “offered a laundry list of 
reasons not to regulate,” none related to the actual text of the 
statute.197 This failure to act in light of Congress’ instructions 
 
191 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007).  
192 Id. (“Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial 
review[.]”). 
193 Id. at 527–28 (citing Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n. of 
Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  
194 Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 532–33 (“While the statute does condition the exercise of 
EPA’s authority on its formation of a ‘judgment,’ . . . that judgment must 
relate to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,’ 
. . . . Put another way, the use of the word ‘judgment’ is not a roving license 
to ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise discretion within 
defined statutory limits.”). 
197 Id. at 533–34 (“Although we have neither the expertise nor the 
authority to evaluate these policy judgments, it is evident they have nothing 
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amounted to an executive “refusal to execute domestic 
laws.”198 
Despite the permissive standard of review applied to 
agency inaction, courts may come to a similar conclusion 
regarding the SEC’s refusal to conduct commission-initiated 
review. Dodd-Frank states that the SEC “on an ongoing basis 
shall review each security-based swap . . . to make a 
determination that such security-based swap . . . should be 
required to be cleared.”199 Congress’ intent is clear—the SEC 
must review every product type within its jurisdiction and 
make a clearing mandate determination for each. Since the 
regulatory strategy established in the SEC Process Rule will 
fail to do so the agency is in violation of the statutory 
mandate.200 
The SEC may argue that Dodd-Frank, unlike the Clean Air 
Act, does not require it act “by regulation,”201 and therefore 
its note in the SEC Process Rule that it would not initiate 
rulemaking is not a violation of the statute.202 However, as 
the Supreme Court noted, “agency refusals to initiate 
rulemaking are . . . subject to special formalities, including a 
public explanation.”203 The EPA failed to justify how its 
failure to act, despite clear instruction from Congress, would 
promote the purposes Congress provided. The SEC’s approach 
is even more egregious: it has failed to provide any 
explanation of its approach to commission-initiated review, 
whether in light of Dodd-Frank’s goals and instructions or 
 
to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change. 
Still less do they amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a 
scientific judgment.”). 
198 Id. at 534. 
199 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  
200 See supra Part III. 
201 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012). 
202 See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for 
Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; 
Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602, 41,604 n.16 (July 13, 2012) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
203 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 527 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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otherwise. The SEC Process Rule provided no response to the 
discussions in Part III of this Note regarding the nature of 
security-based swaps products or industry concerns regarding 
uncertainty in the market. On its own, the agency’s failure to 
justify the submission-only approach should be considered a 
violation of the statute akin to the one found in Massachusetts 
v. EPA. 
B. The Pitfalls: The Constitutional Standing 
Requirement of Injury-in-Fact 
While a suit brought against the SEC for failure to regulate 
may be successful, it could be difficult to find a party who is 
both willing and able to sue. The constitutional minimum of 
standing, as established by the Supreme Court, requires (1) 
an injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.204 As 
the injury must be concrete and particularized, and actual or 
imminent,205 this element will be particularly difficult for 
most parties to establish. 
The potentially regulated parties—the financial 
institutions trading security-based swaps which would be 
subject to the central clearing mandate—should be able to 
establish injury-in-fact if they choose to bring suit. The 
uncertainty resulting from the SEC’s approach and the 
related disruption to security-based swaps markets should be 
enough to show injury and allow the suit to proceed. However, 
though regulated parties have already expressed concerns,206 
security-based swap traders may not wish to take on the cost 
of a lawsuit. The “Pandora’s box” uncertainty of the regulatory 
action they could prompt will also likely further deter such 
litigation. Because the SEC’s commission-initiated review 
could lead to unexpected results, the eventual regulation may 
be costly to the individual entity bringing the suit or benefit 
its competitors. For these reasons, it would be unavailing to 
look to financial entities to serve as plaintiffs, even though 
they have the clearest access to judicial review. 
 
204 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
205 Id. at 560. 
206 See Cooper, supra note 182, at 2. 
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Unfortunately, although members of the public may be 
able to petition the SEC to engage in rulemaking, it is doubtful 
they could establish the injury element for standing to sue if 
the SEC refuses to comply. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
environmental groups—the ostensible regulatory 
beneficiaries of the Endangered Species Act—did not have 
standing to sue over agencies’ alleged procedural violations.207 
The Court held that “a plaintiff raising only a generally 
available grievance about government—claiming only harm 
to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the 
Constitution and laws . . . does not state an Article III case or 
controversy.”208 The SEC’s rejection of future petitions to 
regulate is a similar procedural harm, and accordingly would 
not be enough to show injury. 
Instead, creative plaintiffs may claim that the SEC’s 
failure to act heightens the systemic risk Dodd-Frank meant 
to combat, and therefore all participants in the national 
economy should have standing to sue. This contention is also 
likely to fail, though, as it is doubtful this injury is sufficiently 
particularized, concrete, and imminent enough to satisfy 
courts. Therefore, it will be difficult for the average citizen to 
establish standing and pursue a case against the SEC on its 
merits. 
C. Political Accountability: Using Elected Officials to 
Pressure the SEC into Action 
As a private suit may not be a productive solution to the 
issue, it may be worthwhile to look to the source of the 
mandate: Congress itself. Although Dodd-Frank was passed 
by a prior Congress, current members of the House and 
Senate should act to ensure the legislation accomplishes its 
intended effect. Even with Democrats in control of the House, 
uncertainty remains about the potential of amendment of 
Dodd-Frank, but minority senators or house Democrats could 
use oversight powers to conduct hearings and push the SEC 
toward more effective regulatory solutions. Indeed, members 
 
207 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555. 
208 Id. at 573–74. 
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of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs have previously pressured the SEC on implementation 
of other provisions of Dodd-Frank.209 It is possible that these 
senators have not taken similar action on the central clearing 
mandate because of the focus on the CFTC’s activity and the 
SEC’s opacity in establishing its eventual process. But if the 
central clearing requirement and its risk-prevention and 
transparency benefits are to be realized in the security-based 
swaps market, such involvement may be necessary here as 
well. 
To assist this effort, further study would prove particularly 
useful. While political actors will be less inclined to slow 
economic growth with regulatory approaches targeting 
potential systemic risk, evidence that implementation of the 
central clearing mandate benefits markets may have more of 
an impact. Bank of England researchers have engaged in 
some of this analysis—but looked only to the performance of a 
single product type (vanilla interest rate swaps) under the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction—since use of swap execution facilities 
and the central clearing mandate began.210 The differences 
between the CFTC’s and the SEC’s Dodd-Frank 
implementations provide a distinct opportunity to expand this 
analysis and examine the statistical impact of the SEC’s lack 
of action in particular. 
An empirical analysis could compare, for example, the 
broad-based CDS index market (currently subject to the 
CFTC’s central clearing requirement) and the single-name 
CDS market (part of the SEC’s uncovered Title VII 
jurisdiction) at points both prior to and after the 
implementation of the Initial CFTC Clearing Mandate. 
 
209 See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, Four Democrats Seek Probe into Reviews 




210 See Evangelos Benos, Richard Payne & Michalis Vasios, Centralized 
Trading, Transparency and Interest Rate Swap Market Liquidity: Evidence 
from the Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act (Bank of Eng., Working 
Paper No. 580, 2018). 
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Review of these products’ volume, bid-ask spread, execution 
costs, and other statistical indicators of market depth and 
liquidity could shed some light on the regulations’ impacts on 
market efficiency and systemic risk. Such a study could 
additionally illustrate the specific impacts of the uncertainty 
(as discussed in the Citadel letter211) the SEC’s approach 
causes. If this analysis enhances the Bank of England’s 
findings that “centralized trading, as mandated by Dodd-
Frank” increased activity and improved liquidity, 212 it may 
prompt or assist the political pressure advocated for herein. 
Regardless of the results, such a study would also provide 
some much-needed clarity in the ongoing debate surrounding 
the efficacy of central clearing as a regulatory approach to risk 
and market efficiency.213 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ten years on, some of the worst impacts of the financial 
crisis have faded from public view. While regulatory and 
market forces have changed the shape of the economy, the 
political imperatives created by the crisis’s turbulence have 
ebbed and many no longer treat the need for solutions as 
urgent. Despite these receding political incentives, though, it 
is critical that the Financial Regulators continue to fulfill 
their mandates and prevent another catastrophe. 
The central clearing mandate initially emerged as a crucial 
regulatory reform on a global scale. For its proponents, 
including those responsible for determining the scope of 
regulatory reforms, central clearing would help fix the 
instability and opacity of the OTC derivatives market. 
Widespread central clearing could prevent the domino-effect 
collapses and conflagration of fear that catalyzed the market 
crashes of 2008. For these goals to come to fruition, Dodd-
Frank’s original intent must be upheld. Although the CFTC’s 
implementation has been successful in a portion of the 
market, the SEC must change its current approach and fulfill 
 
211 See Cooper, supra note 182, at 2. 
212 See Benos et al., supra note 210, at 1. 
213 See supra Section III.C. 
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its side of the bargain. Hopefully, with changes to the SEC 
approach as outlined herein, the Financial Regulators will 
plan the necessary roles to prevent such problems from 
arising anew. 
